The aim of this article is to offer a systematic analysis of the French Cour de cassation's plenary Chamber final decision on the Baby Loup case in which it was held that a private nursery had lawfully required one employee to remove her jilhab at work, in accordance with the general religious neutrality requirements contained in the nursery's policy. The article examines the decision in light of ECtHR and French domestic legal requirements. The employee wished to wear a jilbab, that is a long coat garment covering the whole body and the hair but leaving the face visible. Leaving the face visible, the jilhab would not fall under the French
INTRODUCTION
On 25 June 2014, the French Cour de cassation in its plenary Chamber decision ruled that a private nursery known as Baby Loup had lawfully required one employee to remove her non-face covering Islamic jilhab at work, 1 in accordance with the general religious neutrality requirements contained in the nursery's policy. 2 The 6 According to the employment tribunal, the nursery's activities could be characterized as a public service hence triggering the application of laïcité and general religious neutrality requirements. In contrast, for the Court of appeal of Versailles, religious neutrality requirements were mandated by the nursery's mission: offering care to young children. 7 The term 'referral' is used rather than 'appeal' because Court of appeal decisions in France can only be challenged on points of law. The functions of the Cour de cassation are primarily to review the legal basis of decisions reached by the Court of appeal, rather than to act as a third level of appeal on the merits. For an explanation in English of the French court system, see J Bell, S Boyron, and S Whittaker, erred in its choice of legal basis but had nevertheless reached the correct outcome. Laïcité, confirmed the plenary Chamber, was not applicable. However, it added, a general ban could still meet legal proportionality and anti-discrimination requirements. Following the Court of appeal of Paris' findings, the Cour de cassation then went on to rule that in a small nursery where all members of staff came into contact with children, concerns for children's freedom of conscience could warrant a general obligation of religious neutrality. Moreover, the Court did not think it necessary to examine whether the restriction amounted to discrimination on the ground of religion presumably because, adopting the Procureur général's non legally binding opinion, 17 the employee concerned was still free to hold her Muslim beliefs. The Court of appeal of Paris' conclusion that the dismissal had been fair and justified was consequently upheld.
The case is interesting in many respects: it illustrates the legal complexities underlying religious claims in employment contexts and the intertwining of various layers of norms that are potentially applicable. cassation holding otherwise lies in the unconvincing abstract assumptions underlying its reasoning. The Cour de cassation relies on the assumption that the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols by nursery assistants is necessarily harmful to the young children attending the nursery. A concrete evidence-based assessment of the facts would have led to a more rigorous and fairer treatment of the case.
A Disproportionate and Discriminatory Restriction
According to the Cour de cassation's final 2014 decision on Baby Loup, the case fell under private employment law. It thus rejected the views of the employment tribunal, which had brought the case under the public law remit by characterizing the nursery's mission as one of public service, and of the Court of appeal of Paris, which had sought to justify general religious neutrality duties by referring to the laïc ethos which the nursery was allegedly promoting. The Cour de cassation held in 2014 that the case was irrefutably a purely private law case.
As such private law employment provisions applied and in particular articles L1121-1 and L1321-3 of the Chamber, a general requirement of neutrality is not proportionate because of its wide ambit -all staff, without any distinction, are affected by the prohibition which moreover applies across all of the nursery's activities and in all of the nursery's premises. Furthermore, because this requirement is more likely to affect Muslim women, it constitutes an indirect discrimination. This, I contend, was the correct analysis and logical conclusion to reach. 31 The Cour de cassation in 2014 however thought otherwise: the restriction, despite its wide scope within 27 Supra, (n 20). 28 Supra (n 15). 29 Supra (n 8). 30 Supra (n 2). 31 See also, F Laronze, 'Affaire Baby-Loup: l'épuisement du droit dans sa recherche d'une vision apolitisée de la religion' (2014) Droit social 100; M Peyronnet, 'Baby-Loup: passage en force des juges d'appel', (2013) Rec D Actualités.
the company, was proportionate. This conclusion relies on the particular constraints weighing upon the nursery, notably its small size which mandated that all members of staff come into contact with the children in its care
and its location in a multi-confessional socially deprived area where the risk of religious tensions was thought to be particularly harmful. Assuming for now that the exposure to religious symbols may indeed inherently jeopardize the social harmony of the locality and put children's freedom of conscience at risk, it remains difficult to understand why intermittent contact with children should justify permanent full-time restrictions on religious manifestation in the workplace. The plenary Chamber of the Cour de cassation claims to have carried out a concrete assessment of proportionality requirements: looking beyond the wording of the contested clause, it considered the surrounding context and took into account the particular structure and specific goals of the Baby Loup nursery. It is submitted that this so-called contextual approach is in reality abstract in nature. The scope of the restrictions indeed relates to the special character attributed to the institution but it ignores how they might be connected (or not) to the specific tasks assigned to the employee concerned. requirements in Baby Loup. There is no reason why the freedom to manifest religious beliefs should be treated differently to any other fundamental freedom. On the contrary the ECtHR has underlined the importance that
Member States need to attach to religious freedom claims in an employment setting. 36 If there is to be an implicit hierarchy, one might expect that the freedom to manifest religious beliefs would be higher up than the liberty to have wine at meal times. To justify this unduly low status conferred to employees' religious freedom rights, the plenary Chamber of the Cour de cassation refers to the specificities of the child care sector. However, as will be shown below, no evidence supports this suggestion that child care sector employees should automatically enjoy a lesser degree of religious freedom than other rivate law employees. ECtHR cases suggest that religious freedom claims can no longer be summarily dismissed. Secondly, the assumption that non-face covering Islamic dress will necessarily conflict with children's freedom of conscience an no longer be entertained.
B Specific Rules for Child Care Sector Employees

A. Outdated Filters
Statements in the recent SAS decision have revealed that the ECtHR will now be more attentive to the dilemmas faced by individuals in such situations. In SAS, the ECtHR was sensitive to the impossible choice faced by the demanded or to face criminal sanctions. There is no doubt that the ECtHR would show particular concerns for the sacrifice that the Baby Loup nursery employee was forced to make: giving up wearing the jilbab at work, contrary to her religious beliefs or giving up her job altogether.
The outdated specific situation rule
The specific situation rule, also known as the contracting-out approach, whereby employees are deemed to have willingly agreed to religious restrictions under the terms and conditions of their employment contract, has now been explicitly abandoned by the ECtHR in Eweida and Others. 46 This approach, also favoured by English courts, 47 is nevertheless still implicit in the 2014 Cour de cassation's reasoning. The fact that the Baby Loup nursery's policy already contained a religious neutrality clause (albeit a weaker version) when the employee joined the nursery is (wrongly) held against her. The reasoning adopted by the 2014 Cour de cassation decision is therefore problematic from a ECHR perspective.
An outdated appraisal of children's fundamental rights
The substantive rationale put forward by the Cour de cassation -respect for children's freedom of conscience-is even more contentious. The ECtHR has in the past appeared to share some of the Cour de cassation's concerns towards the wearing of the Islamic dress in presence of children. In Dahlab v Switzerland, 48 a primary school teacher teaching in a state school in Geneva was dismissed for having refused to remove her Islamic scarf. The
Swiss Courts upheld the dismissal on the basis of the principle of laïcité which applied in the Geneva Swiss
Canton. 49 The ECtHR approved the position of the Swiss authorities. Many of the Court's statements in Dahlab seem to be relevant to Baby Loup:
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children.
The applicant's pupils were aged between four and eight, an age at which children wonder about many things and are also more easily influenced than older pupils.
It is not absolutely certain that these factors would apply mutatis mutandis to nursery French children who are under 3 years of age. At such a young age, children might not have reached the questioning phase referred to in
Dahlab and their encounters with their nursery carer might be less frequent than the daily contacts between 46 Supra (n 36), para 83. 47 shown below however, the common values appealed to in Baby Loup are unlikely to be granted such prevailing force.
B. Common Values
The Cour de cassation approved the general restriction imposed in Baby Loup in the name of children's fundamental rights. As will be demonstrated below, this justification in fact hides a more general political goal of secularizing French society as well as considerations for parental preferences. In this section I will argue, relying on the most recent ECtHR case-law, that neither of these hidden agenda should prevail over the employee's religious freedom rights.
Religious neutrality and social integration: comparison with the SAS case
50
The aim of the paragraph is to prove that the social considerations which proved decisive in the SAS case cannot be transferred to a Baby-Loup type scenario. Many of the Court's statements in Baby Loup refer to the need to protect social harmony. According to the nursery's statutes, the aim pursued by the Baby Loup nursery was to promote the integration of women living in socially deprived areas and offer childcare to babies and toddlers.
The Court of appeal of Paris 51 and the plenary Chamber of the Cour de cassation 52 both infer from these goals a duty of religious neutrality. However, whether separately or jointly, it is not shown why the aims of preserving social cohesion and children's rights should warrant strict religious neutrality. Despite a similar lack of evidence, the ECtHR, in SAS v France, was content to uphold a general ban on fully-face covering clothing for the sake of protecting the minimum requirements of living together. 53 Given the importance of the face in our contemporary societies, the ECtHR accepted that wearing the burqa could be perceived as putting social harmony into In the paragraph to follow, I will contend that the mere fact for nursery assistants to be wearing a hiljab does not equate to indoctrination. In the Lautsi case, 73 the ECtHR suggested that the mere presence of a religious symbol could not in itself amount to indoctrination. Less convincingly, the Court added in Lautsi that the crucifix was devoid of indoctrinating effect because it was only 'passive'. A symbol worn by a teacher or nursery assistant, by contrast, might hence be characterized as 'active' and therefore be construed as having a more 'powerful ' impact on children than a static sign hanging on classroom walls. The distinction would however be arbitrary. A static symbol may speak volumes. 74 Moreover it would be rather paradoxical for the ECtHR to protect symbols affixed by state authorities more strongly than symbols worn by individual teachers and employees. Whereas the State is not a human right holder, the individual teacher or employee is entitled to express their religious faith under article 9 of the Convention. Since Lautsi, the ECtHR has taken more care in assessing the personal motivations of religious symbol wearers. In SAS, it thus strongly rejected unilateral descriptions of the burqa as a symbol of oppression against women. 75 Moreover in the cases of Mennesson and interests in surrogacy contexts. 77 By analogy, it is submitted that the Court is likely to refuse abstract assumptions about the harmful or proselytising effect that the hiljab may have on young nursery children. In the absence of concrete evidence that the wearing of the hiljab by nursery assistants affects children's freedom of conscience, the restriction imposed by Baby Loup would not therefore meet ECHR requirements.
CONCLUSION
The Baby Loup final decision of 25 June 2014 put an end to six years of litigation. 78 It has not however put an end to the underlying intense debates raised by the case. From a domestic perspective, the decision is ambiguous.
It holds the principle of laïcité to be irrelevant to the case and yet reasons as if it were applicable. It claims to protect fundamental rights of children and yet make their protection dependent on the provisions of nursery policies. More broadly, the Baby Loup decision is illustrative of suspicions in France towards religion and of recent attempts to extend laïcité beyond the public sphere. 79 As a result, religious freedoms in the workplace appear to be less protected in France than other civil liberties, at least in the childcare sector. 80 This new ordering, as demonstrated in this article, is not compatible with ECHR requirements.
On the contrary, the ECtHR has reasserted the importance of religious freedoms. None of the techniques that the ECtHR has at times used to allow broad restrictions is likely to be applicable in a Baby Loup context. The wide margin of appreciation that France enjoyed in the SAS case is thus unlikely to apply in litigation opposing religious freedoms to corporate interests. The contracting out approach which used to put the onus on the employee (forced to change jobs or refrain from manifesting her beliefs) has now been disavowed.
Similarly, attempts to restrict protection to core beliefs would no longer be approved. Moreover, the looser proportionality test that the ECtHR has used when article 9 rights conflict with national policies would not be 77 If children's best interests may in abstracto justify that surrogacy be prohibited (so as to avoid the commodification and reification of children), consideration of children's interests in concreto demands that children born illegally out of surrogacy may nevertheless have their legal parentage recognised with their commissioning parents. As well as the widely different context of both cases, one important difference must however be noted: in Baby Loup the abstract assessment of the best interest principle did not contravene children's rights but the child care workers in contact with children. The surrogacy cases nevertheless confirm the recent ECtHR trend to avoid blank abstract assessments of right violations. 78 Litigation has come to an end at domestic level. However the Cour de cassation plenary Chamber decision may now be challenged before the ECtHR. See supra (n 3). 79 See S Hennette-Vauchez and V Valentin, L'Affaire Baby Loup ou la nouvelle laïcité (LGDJ 2014). 80 The dismissal of a supermarket employee who had refused to remove her scarf was held to be void. http://www.ouest-france.fr/carrefour-condamne-pour-avoir-licencie-une-salarie-voilee-2833628 accessed 27 October 2014.
